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[Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the 
Supreme Court of Canada. By Patrick Monahan. Toronto: Cars-
well, 1987.] 
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL CASES POLITICAL? 
Brian Slattery* 
"The judge's task is to remain as far as humanly possible impar-
tial, free of his own biases or prejudices. Unwittingly, no doubt, 
everyone's thinking is to some extent a product of his or her 
upbringing and education. But the constant struggle is to decide, 
free of preconceived notions, to the end that the decision is in 
the best interests of the parties and the country.1'' Justice John 
Sopinka, in a speech delivered at his inauguration as a Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Most judges think that, when asked to decide constitutional issues, 
they should detach themselves from any related political controversies 
and their personal views on these matters, and decide the issues in 
accordance with the Constitution, and "in the best interests of the 
parties and the country." But is there a rational way to resolve constitu-
tional issues that does not in the end draw heavily on political considera-
tions? When judges try to determine what the best interests of the 
parties and-the country require, are they doing anything essentially 
different from politicians? Is deciding a constitutional case really an 
exercise in politics, if perhaps in a disguised or covert form? 
The view that politics lies at the core of constitutional decision-
making is not a new one, but it has won new adherents in recent years, 
and in Canada has gained added plausibility with the enactment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 2 It is presented with flair and 
passion in a recent book by Patrick Monahan, a Professor at Osgoode 
Hall Law School. The book, entitled Politics and the Constitution: The 
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am indebted to John 
Evans, Eric Gertner, Joel Bakan and Peter Hogg for their helpful comments on an earlier 
version of this essay. 
1 As reported in The Globe and Mail, Toronto, June 24, 1988. 
" Part I of the Coniltitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. ll (hereafter referred to as the Charter). 
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Charter, Federalism and the Supreme Court of Canada,3 is lively and 
provocative, and its central claims deserve close consideration. 
Monahan's first major theme is announced in his opening passage: · 
As I argue in this book, the constitutional issues that reach the Supreme Court 
are fundamentally and inescapably political. Constitutional argument asks 
the Court to help define who we are as individuals and as a people. Such 
questions cannot be answered through the application of some specialized or 
technical brand of expertise. What is demanded are political choices and acts 
of political will.4 
Two interwoven strands of argument run through this passage. The 
main point, of course,~ that constitutional issues are essentially politi-
cal in nature. Monahan does not clearly indicate here what he means by 
"political" - a point that will occupy us later. But he implies that 
politics is somehow wrapped up with questions as to our individual and 
collective "identity," and in later passages he suggests more broadly that 
all questions of value are political. It should be noted that the claim is not 
simply that constitutional cases incidentally raise political considera-
tions, or that judges may find it difficult to detach themselves utterly 
from politics, for these obvious points would hardly be worth making. 
Monahan is concerned to establish that constitutional issues are politi-
cal at their core, that the search for a distinct "constitutional" basis for 
resolving them is misguided. 
The second strand of argument, although presented by Monahan as 
closely related to the first, is actually quite distinct. It suggests that 
constitutional issues can only be answered by "political choices and acts 
of political will" or, as Monahan later remarks, by a process that is 
"political and discretionary" in nature.5 Now, the point that constitu-
tional cases require "choices," "acts of will" or the exercise of "discre-
tion" in no way follows inevitably from the argument that these cases are 
political in nature. Just because an issue is political does not mean that it 
can only be decided by an "act of will," with all the suggestion of 
arbitrariness and subjectivity that this expression carries, rather than, 
for example, by a process of rational deliberation, involving reference to 
first principles or, alternatively, by an exercise of practical judgment 
informed by experience and reflection or, indeed, by intuition. Mon-
ahan's choice of terms implies that politics is an arena of contending 
passions and preferences, where conflicts are resolved by acts of power 
expressing the ruler's will. This viewpoint, which needless to say has a 
' 1987. 
• Id., at iii. 
"Id. 
------ --·---- -------·· ----
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remarkably old-fashioned and positivist air, will receive extended con-
sideration later. 
Monahan identifies a further aspect of his first major theme. He 
argues that, while most legal scholarship "regards constitutional analy-
sis as a specialized and technical form of reasoning," in fact constitu-
tional questions cannot be answered through the application of some 
special brand of expertise. 6 The point is said to carry an important 
consequence: "Under this new perception, constitutional analysis and 
argument would become a legitimate matter of concern to all Canadians, 
rather than the preserve of an elite group of specialists or experts."7 
Once again, it is unclear how far this further argument flows from the 
book's first main theme. For even if Monahan is right in maintaining 
that constitutional issues are political, it by no means follows that 
specialized abilities are unimportant or dispensable. As is well known, 
political questions are often subtle and multi-faceted, with complex 
social, economic and historical dimensions. Consider, for example, the 
intricacies of the recent debate over free trade with the United States, 
and the convoluted political and historical arguments for and against 
Quebec separatism. It is not implausible to think that some form of 
expertise might help us to grapple with these issues. Having got this far, 
we may also wonder if some special qualifications may not be necessary 
for deciding constitutional cases. Monahan seems to want us to suppress 
these thoughts as undemocratic: specialized or technical qualifications, 
he argues, are unimportant in resolving political and constitutional 
questions alike. 
Now, it should be said that the Canadian legal profession, whatever its 
faults, has not in recent times (if ever) celebrated judges simply for their 
skill at applying "a specialized and technical form of reasoning" in 
constitutional matters. True, judges can be found who evidently regard 
the interpretation of the Constitution as akin to the elaboration of the 
theorems of some arcane system of legal geometry. But such judges are 
generally regarded as poor judges, and rightly so. For while judges must, 
on the ordinary view, be people with specialized skills, they must also be 
people of wisdom and good practical sense, grounded in broad experi-
ence. But Monahan must mean more than this. He must be suggesting 
not just that specialized expertise is inadequate in itself to decide consti-
tutional issues (for here he is only stating the obvious), but that it is 
relatively unimportant or even unnecessary. Judges, it would seem, are 
little more competent to resolve such issues than ordinary people. 
Monahan articulates a second major theme in his work. We are told 
6 Id. 
7 J.d., at iii-iv. 
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that "constitutional scholarship must be conceived and practiced within 
an expanded universe, one which includes and is sensitive to the whole of 
political and social theory."8 This theme, then, emphasizes the impor-
tance of theory in the resolution of constitutional cases. As Monahan 
goes on to explain: 
For lawyers, whose training has been focused almost exclusively on the details 
and distinctions contained in particular cases, this is a daunting prospect 
indeed. What is demanded is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of 
one's way of thinking and approaching problems. In concrete terms, it means 
paying less attention to the details of particular cases and examining the 
interconnections and themes underlying whole areas of doctrine. It means, 
further, attempting to identify the assumptions, both explicit and implicit, 
which underlie and inform the doctrine. It means attempting to understand 
the provisional and partial nature of those assumptions and imagining an 
alternative way of approaching the problems presented.9 
This is a slightly puzzling passage. On the one hand, it announces what 
the author evidently takes to be a revolutionary doctrine; and yet, on the 
other hand, the specifics of the doctrine might seem to require us to do 
only what many Canadian lawyers and judges have long thought it their 
job to do, namely, to approach cases with an eye not only to their specific 
facts but also to their basic underlying issues. In the common law world, 
it is generally supposed that a court should decide a case according to the 
governing precedents, a process that often requires the judge to identify 
the general principles and values informing previous decisions. 
This fact is reflected in a standard modern introduction to Canadian 
law designed for beginning law students. The author, Stephen Wad-
dams, observes that, just as the legal theorist should test his or her ideas 
against concrete cases, the legal practitioner should be attuned to the 
theoretical implications of particular issues. He goes on to explain: 
It would, of course, be impossible to learn every sfogle judicial decision as a 
separate "rule" of law. It would also be fruitless. It is useless to know that on a 
particular set of facts the law requires a particular result, if the reason for the 
result is not also appreciated. Without an appreciation of the principle that 
governs the decision one cannot even begin to pick out from the mass of facts 
that constitute each case those that are relevant. The good lawyer, and by this 
I mean the good practising lawyer, as well as the good academic, must 
appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments that support each 
legal "rule". If the arguments are open to challenge, they will be challenged, if 
not in the County Court tomorrow, at least in the Supreme Court of Canada in 
ten years' time. 10 
8 Id., at iv. 
9 Id. 
10 Waddams, Introduction to the Study of Law (1979), at 25-26. 
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Yet again, it seems that Monahan must mean more than this: for 
whatever he has in mind requires "a fundamental reorientation of one's 
way of thinking and approaching problems." What then does the revolu-
tionary program demand? The answer appears to be that judges should 
go beyond the low and middle level generalizations that are the usual 
stuff of decisions and engage in the kind of highly abstract and far-
reaching theorizing favoured by some legal, social and political phi-
losophers. To the extent, then, that Canadian judges have hitherto 
preferred a contextual, "case by case" approach over one that employs 
quasi-deductive inferences from abstract first principles, Monahan 
seems to think they have got it wrong. That is, he thinks that current 
methods of deciding constitutional cases make insufficient use of high-
flown social and political theory. 
Monahan, then, is making several rather different points: first, consti-
tutional cases turn on issues that are basically political in nature; second, 
issues of this kind can be resolved only by subjective "acts of will" rather 
than more objective modes of rational deliberation; third, good constitu-
tional judging does not require much specialized or technical expertise; 
and finally, courts are insufficiently theoretical in their approach to 
constitutional issues, too tied up in the facts of particular cases. 
I think that all four points are misleading in their dogmatic simplicity, 
and that the final point - that courts are insufficiently theoretical - is 
incompatible with the third point, and probably also the second. To see 
why, one must look more closely at the way in which Monahan elabo-
rates his major themes. These themes demand, of course, more extensive 
treatment than they can receive in a short essay such as this. My concern 
throughout is simply to point out that the issues are more complex than 
Monahan's arguments acknowledge, and that the solutions to them may 
well lie in directions different from those he indicates. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE BASIC CLAIM 
At the start, an important point needs clarification. When Monahan 
argues that constitutional cases are in some essential way "political," is 
he making a descriptive cum conceptual claim, or is the claim ultimately 
a normative one? On the first _view, Monahan is advancing a descriptive 
thesis which holds that, despite appearances, judges deciding constitu-
tional cases are actually motivated by ''political" factors rather than the 
"legal" arguments deployed in the judgments. This thesis is allied with a 
conceptual argument to the effect that, on a correct understanding of the 
true natures of law and politics, it can be seen that constitutional issues 
fall into the latter category. Overall, the argument takes the form of an 
512 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW [Vol.11:481 
"unmasking,'' where an impressive false facade is torn away to reveal the 
humble reality within. 
However, Monahan's argument can also be underatood as normative 
in nature. On this view, he is ultimately making claims about the way in 
which judges and lawyers ought rationally to proceed in arguing and 
deciding constitutional cases - that is, by explicitly taking into account 
political factors, or perhaps by employing a political mode of decision-
making. In other words, he is concerned with identifying the correct way 
to go about deciding constitutional cases, while at the same time deplor-
ing prevailing methods. Now, it is possible, of course, that this argument 
is wedded to a conceptual thesis and perhaps also a descriptive one. 
Thus, Monahan could conceivably be arguing that, since constitutional 
cases are in essence political, they ought to be decided in a political 
manner, and to some extent judges already do this, even if they are 
unwilling to acknowledge this fact openly. 
What sort of claim, then, is Monahan making? The answer is not 
completely clear. At times, he seems to be advancing basically normative 
arguments, that is, arguments about how judges ought rationally to go 
about deciding constitutional cases. In short, he is attempting to define 
the proper role of the judiciary in the constitutional sphere. Thus, when 
Monahan maintains, in the passage quoted earlier, that the constitu-
tional issues reaching the Supreme Court are "inescapably political," he 
clearly does not mean that judges are factually compelled to deal with 
them in a political manner, for they could always decide them in other 
ways - by the toss of a coin or by consulting astrologists or the spirits of 
the departed. Neither does he seem to mean that at present judges 
actually deal with these issues politically, at least in the normal case. 
Rather, he apparently means that, on a correct appreciation of the issues 
at stake, judges ought to decide them by taking political factors into 
consideration or by adopting a political mode of reasoning. Likewise, 
when he says that constitutional argument "asks the Court to help define 
who we are as individuals and as a people," he is talking about the way in 
which constitutional argument should ideally be conducted or under-
stood, rather than what is actually said by lawyers appearing before the 
Supreme Court. 
In so far, then, as Monahan is arguing that constitutional cases ought 
to be decided in a political manner, he owes his readers an explanation of 
what he understands by "politics." He does not seem to have in mind the 
way in which Canadian politicians actually behave. Otherwise, he could 
be understood as suggesting that cases should be resolved on the basis of 
public opinion polls, regional interests, party-political loyalties, or even 
the contending parties' respective contributions to party coffers. It is not 
enough for Monahan to suggest that judges ought to act politically, 
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without going on to indicate what the true goals of politics are, what 
standards ought to govern its practitioners and how political decisions 
should be made. That is, his normative theory of constitutional ad-
judication requires a normative theory of politics. 
At other times, however, Monahan seems to be advancing a basically 
descriptive cum conceptual thesis that seeks to expose constitutional 
adjudication for what it reany is. Moreover, as we will see shortly, this 
descriptive thesis is penetrated with such a high degree of skepticism 
that it seems to rule out the very possibility that a sound normative basis 
. for political or constitutional decision-making can ever be found. In 
short, the critical edge that characterizes this aspect ofMonahan's work 
seems to cut against his own normative arguments, presented in other 
parts of the book. 
At any rate, it is clear that the force of any argument that assimilates 
constitutional decision-making to politics depends largely on how pol-
itics is characterized. What then does Monahan mean by politics, and 
how does he think it should be practised? In the next two sections, I will 
attempt to find an answer. 
IL POLITICS AND GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
For a work entitled "Politics and the Constitution," the space devoted 
to the nature-and ends of politics is remarkably meagre. The author's 
views on the matter are presented in a piecemeal and indirect manner, 
mainly in passages discussing the "political" character of constitutional 
cases.11 I will consider several of these passages, in the hope of building 
up a rounded picture of the author's ideas. 
A good starting-point is a passage in which Monahan considers the 
judicial application of the Charter: 
Even a cursory analysis of the language and structure of the Charter indicates 
that most Charter litigation may well turn on the issue of the "wisdom" of 
legislative choices. In part, this is a product of the abstract and generalized 
nature of the rights protected by the Charter. The very process of defining the 
content of the rights protected by the Charter seems inherently political. 
Many of these rights - most not.ably the right to "equality" and "liberty" -
contain little or no substantive criteria; they resemble blank slates on which 
the judiciary can scrawl the imagery of their choice. 12 
This passage, then, tacitly suggests that politics involves a process 
whereby those possessing power impose their will on others, projecting 
n See, for example, the p!ll!Sages in Monahan, supra, note 3, at 7-8, 53-56, 58-59, 
71-72, 135, and 158-59. 
12 Id., at 53. 
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imagery of their own choosing on the blank screens furnished by such 
vague ideals as "equality" and "liberty." Politics is not governed by any 
substantive standards worth taking seriously. Since the Charter forces 
judges to make the same kind of unconstrained personal choices, it 
mandates an essentially political process. 
The argument gives rise to several intriguing points. We note first the 
wavering between a descriptive and a normative approach. When Mon-
ahan impllcitly characterizes politics as the exercise of unconstrained 
power, does he mean to suggest only that this is how politics is actually 
carried on or, rather, that, for various reasons, politics cannot (or should 
not) be conducted in any other manner? The answer, it must be said, is 
not very obvious. Either way, the author seems to hold a low opinion of 
politics; he implies that political debates about the nature of equality and 
liberty are nothing (and can be nothing) but the venting of highly 
subjective opinions and preferences. 
On this view, the political question that confronted the Canadian 
government after the bombing of Pearl Harbour - whether it should 
detain Canadians of Japanese ancestry and confiscate their properties -
comes down to a question of subjective preference and will. Should the 
government follow the preferences of many British Columbians, steeped 
in racial animosity and fear, or should it favour the preference of Jap-
anese-Canadians to continue their lives in liberty? Whose views should 
the government prefer? There is no point, according to Monahan, in 
trying to pretend that "equality" or "freedom" are at stake here, for these 
are empty ideals, containing little or no substantive criteria. The govern-
ment may do as it will. 
But does the fact that a decision-making process (whether political or 
constitutional) is governed by general norms necessarily mean that the 
process is an arbitrary one, requiring resort to personal values and 
preferences? The answer depends on what role we think general norms 
should play in the making of particular decisions. If one thinks that 
general norms should be capable of supporting the deduction of specific 
propositions about concrete cases with a high degree of certainty, on a 
quasi-geometrical model, then, like Monahan, one will be disturbed by 
the fact that general constitutional standards, such as those found in the 
Charter, cannot readily be used in this manner; and one will be tempted 
to conclude that the process of applying them is essentially uncon-
strained and arbitrary. However, if one views the task of making con-
crete decisions in the light of general standards as a practical art rather 
than an exercise in deductive logic, the matter appears in an altogether 
different light. 
It is common experience that the practical principles or "maxims" 
governing an art are often so abstract as to appear almost meaningless, 
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particularly to the novice or outsider. And we all know that to pursue an 
art successfully it is not enough to memorize these maxims and deduce 
from them the right way to proceed. The maxims reveal their sense only 
to someone who already has a good practical understanding of the art, 
consisting of a tacit and largely inarticulable body of knowledge gained 
through observation and direct experience. As one gains a better prac-
tical command of the art,- one's understanding of its maxims deepens. 
That understanding can never be fully articulated or explained, but 
ultimately can only be "shown" by action. Nonetheless, some people are 
far better at the art than others. And it is the practice of the acknowl-
edged master that ultimately exemplifies the meaning of the art's basic 
maxims.13 
For example, the meaning of the martial arts maxim, that one should 
be "centred" in engaging an opponent, can be understood only by observ-
ing masters and attempting to imitate the ineffable stillness informing 
their movements. Similarly, the ·maxim that parents should be "firm" 
with young children but not "too strict" obviously does not direct any 
determinate course of action and may appear vacuous on that account. 
Yet, as an experienced parent knows, the maxim is far from meaningless. 
Its meaning, however, cannot be determined simply by analysis of the 
expressions "firm" and "too strict," or by consulting dictionaries. It is 
embedded in a body of practical knowledge that cannot be readily 
summed up or communicated in words alone. 
So it can be argued that deciding constitutional cases is a practical art, 
just like playing baseball, raising children, writing short stories, cooking 
a good meal, diagnosing an illness or governing a country. Good constitu-
tional decisions are made, not by logical deductions from explicit consti-
tutional standards, but by tapping one's tacit knowledge of the practicar 
workings of the constitutional system and its implicit values and princi-
ples, which the explicit standards only partially and palely reflect. To 
attempt to use these standards as the sole basis of decision would be like 
trying to learn driving from the provisions of the Highway Traffic Act. 
The fact that the standards are in themselves indeterminate does not 
mean that the decision-making process that they govern is arbitrary or 
unconstrained. It only means that the practical knowledge that guides 
and constrains the decision-making process cannot adequately be stated 
in words. The subtlety of that practical knowledge and the large number 
of variables that it embraces mean that verbal formulations of the basic 
precepts of good constitutional practice will tend to be abstract and 
indeterminate. Thus, the indeterminacy of general constitutional stan-
dards is a reflection of the fact that constitutional decision-making is a 
13 For a brilliant exposition of the theme, see Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (1958; 
corrected edition, 1962). 
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highly concrete and contextual art that requires experience and skill and 
more than a little wisdom. 
III. v ALUES AND OBJECTIVITY 
Let us turn now to another feature identifi~d by Monahan as demon-
strating the political nature of constitutional adjudication: its "value-
laden" character. He writes: 
[A] careful analysis of the early Charter opinions of the Court illustrates the 
inherently "political" character of the Court's reasoning .... The value-laden 
character of the Court's analysis illustrates the hollowness of the claim that 
the legitimacy of judicial review is a non-issue in the Canadian context. If 
judicial review under the Charter is to be justified, it cannot be on the spurious 
basis that the adjudicative process is neutral or objective. Any convincing 
justification must take into account the value-laden nature of judicial review 
and attempt to reconcile this political role for judges with traditional demo-
cratic values.14 
The most striking feature of this passage is its tacit assumption that a 
"value-laden" process cannot be neutral or objective, that it cannot, in 
effect, be other than partisan and subjective in character, that is, "politi-
cal." On this view, neutrality and objectivity in decision-making are 
possible only when the decision can rationally be made without any 
reference to values or value-laden principles. This view is a common and 
plausible one, but nonetheless it is quite wrong. 
First let us be clear about what is at stake. The issue is not whether it is 
possible for a decision-maker to achieye total objectivity or neutrality in 
making evaluative decisions, for it may readily be conceded that total 
objectivity is not within one's grasp. The issue, rather, is whether it is 
possible to achieve any degree of objectivity at all in such matters. That 
is, does it make sense to say that one judge is "more objective" than 
another in making evaluative decisions, or is this like saying that one 
watermelon is more objective than another? More importantly, is there 
any point in judges attempting to be as objective as possible, or is this an 
inherently unavailing task? 
If, as Monahan argues, the need to refer to values in reaching decisions 
precludes objectivity or neutrality, it follows that one value-laden deci-
sion cannot be any more or less objective than any other. For a judge to 
try to achieve any degree of objectivity is to fall prey to a delusion. 
Objectivity is a false and inappropriate ideal, at least for decisions that 
are grounded in human values. Judges, on this view, should frankly 
14 Supra, note 3, at 71-72. 
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recognize this fact and drop the pretence that any measure of neutrality 
is possible. 
Stated this way, the argument has far less intuitive appeal. It is one 
thing to say that it is virtually impossible to have perfect vision, but it is 
another to say that nobody's vision is better than any other's, and that 
there is no point in opening your eyes. ff seems a basic lesson of 
experience that some decision-makers are more partisan and subjective 
than others. We all remember the teacher who treated his "favourites" 
more leniently than other students, and we criticize the judge who lets 
her previous political affiliations influence her disposition of constitu-
tional cases. And when we have to make evaluative decisions, we are 
aware of a difference between yielding to our immediate subjective 
reactions and trying to be more neutral and balanced. Should we, as 
teachers, give a low mark to the student who dismisses our pet theory as 
worthless, or should we attempt to achieve a more detached assessment 
of his abilities? Should we, as judges, dismiss out of hand the arguments 
advanced by the irritating or arrogant counsel, or should we endeavour-to 
appraise them on their merits? 
In short, it is plainly wrong to suggest that trying to be objective in 
making evaluative decisions is a misguided endeavour, like trying to cook 
a more melodious steak or to achieve a spicier golf-swing. Objectivity is a 
quality that characterizes good evaluative decisions, just as dynamism 
and fluidity are the marks of a good gymnast. If we have come to doubt 
this, it is due to the influence of simplistic models often held out for the 
conduct of scientific inquiry, according to which a scientist has to detach 
herself from all values in order to attain objectivity. These models are 
simply inappropriate for any process of evaluative decision-making. But 
even in the purely scientific realm it is difficult to see how the scientist 
can conform to such models without losing respect for the value of truth. 
In reality, scientific inquiry, far from being value-free, is driven and 
sustained by a strong commitment to truth, and the scientist who loses 
sight of this ideal and cooks her results is universally condemned. 
More generally, then, objectivity in decision-making is not to be 
attained by squeezing oneself dry of values. To the contrary, an objective 
decision is one that is animated by the right sort of values and normative 
principles, while bearing no trace of values and principles (to say nothing 
of passions) that are inappropriate in the context. To revert to an earlier 
example, an objective approach to the question of whether it would be 
right to detain Japanese-Canadians after Pearl Harbour would take 
account of such basic norms as the equal respect owed to all persons, 
regardless of race, the right to be presumed innocent before being proven 
guilty, and the right to a fair trial. These norms, which are obviously 
drenched in values, are essential preconditions of any objective assess-
ment of the matter. 
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Of course, someone who maintains that all values are nothing but a 
projection of personal preferences cannot accept this viewpoint. On this 
view, there is no objective basis for saying that some values are more 
relevant to an inquiry than others. But it should be noted that radical 
subjectivism leads to conclusions that are rarely accepted in practice. It 
entails holding that whether one approves or disapproves of the bombing 
of Hiroshima, the discrimination against non-whites in South Africa or 
the wholesale killing of innocents in Pol Pot's Cambodia is ultimately a 
matter of personal preference, like choosing between chocolate-ripple 
and maple-fudge ice cream. Yet only on the assumption that radical 
subjectivism is correct does the presence of values in constitutional 
decision-making rule out the possibility of objectivity. 
Not surprisingly, Monahan ultimately shrinks from endorsing the 
subjectivism implicit in his line of argument. He later remarks, for 
example: "The inescapable reality of the Charter era is that the judiciary 
will inevitably be drawn into making fundamental value choices. The 
issue is not whether or not political choices will be made by courts. The 
issue is whether those choices will be made well or badly."15 Precisely. 
But how can one value choice be adjudged better than any other value 
choice, unless there is some objective basis for making this assessment, a 
basis that transcends mere preference? 
Monahan's attempt to work out an answer is interesting because it 
reveals so clearly the difficulties afflicting those who want to reap the 
benefits of objectivism while retaining moral skepticism as a critical tool. 
Monahan's approach emerges in a passage where he takes issue with the 
view, which he attributes to Chief Justice Dickson's judgment in the 
Operation Dismantle case,16 that: "Politics is passion and subjectivity, 
the irrational working out of conflicting desire and opinion."17 Now, as 
we have seen, this appears-to be the very position that Monahan himself 
espouses elsewhere in his work. But Monahan is here at pains to dis-
associate himself from this view: 
[I]t is a gross oversimplification to suppose that human knowledge comes in 
only two packages, the one labelled "objective", the other, "subjective". To 
put this another way, the mere fact that an issue cannot be resolved in some 
neutral or mechanical fashion does not mean that it must be relegated to the 
category of mere whim or caprice. It is possible to acknowledge the contingent 
and value-laden character of an enterprise and yet make rational and mean-
ingful arguments about that enterprise. In fact, an important tradition in 
contemporary philosophy is premised on the belief that all branches of 
knowledge, including the so-called neutral disciplines of the natural sciences, 
15 Id., at 135 (emphasis added). 
16 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] l S.C.R 441, 18 D .L.R. (4th) 481, 59 N .R. 1, 12 
Ad.min. L.R. 16, 13 C.RR. 287. 
17 Supra, note 3, at 58. 
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are shot through with subjective and contingent elements. This contingency 
does not entail the conclusion that there is noth_ing meaningful to be said 
about these subjects, or that one opinion is necessarily as persuasive as any 
other.18 
These remarks are clearly intended to ward off the imputation of 
subjectivism. Yet it is not clear how Monahan can accomplish this 
without also repudiating much of what he has already said about the 
nature of politics and constitutional cases. He suggests that while all 
branches of knowledge may be "shot through with subjective and con-
tingent elements," it is still possible to make "rational and meaningful" 
arguments, some of which may be more persuasive than others. The 
question, of course, is what firm basis can be found for judging the 
rationality of an argument or assessing its persuasiveness. Unless this 
basis transcends mere personal preference or its social analogues, con-
vention and tradition, it is evident that one has not escaped from 
subjectivity, protestations notwithstanding. 
Monahan attempts to deal with these problems in a later passage: 
The more general point that emerges is that the very dichotomy between 
objectivity and subjectivity which has fueled debates over judicial review is 
itself suspect. Building on the "hermeneutical insight" - the view that "a 
sharp distinction cannot be drawn between understanding the text in its own 
terms and reading the interpreter's concerns into it" - it becomes unneces-
sary to discover some independent, apolitical ground for legal reasoning. In 
this view, the only meaningful use of the term "objectivity" is "the view which 
would be agreed upon as a result of argument undeflected by irrelevant 
considerations." Legal reasoning, along with other· forms of political argu-
ment, is accordingly best understood as contingent yet constrained. It is 
constrained in the sense that legal argument must interpret and advance the 
aspirations and ideals which exemplify the political tradition. Yet it is con-
tingent in the sense that the very act of interpreting those ideals changes 
them; the past is redescribed in order to accommodate the issues raised by the 
present.19 
It seems clear, however, that Monahan has only replaced personal 
subjectivism with its communal equivalent, convention. He says, for 
example, that "the only meaningful use of the term 'objectivity' is 'the 
view which would be agreed upon as a result of argument undeflected by 
irrelevant considerations'."20 But, it may be inquired, how does commu-
nal agreement represent an advance over individual preference, if it 
merely represents the preference of a group? Until comparatively re-
18 ld., at 59. 
is Id., at 158-59 (notes omitted). 
zo Id. (emphasis added). 
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cently in human history, most societies accepted some form of slavery as 
justified. Does this mean that we have no basis today, beyond mere 
convention and agreement, for thinking that slavery is objectionable?. 
Monahan places great store in the virtues of "argument undeflected by 
irrelevant considerations." But how does one go about constructing the 
·right sort of arguments? Are some arguments objectively better than 
others? Or is the better argument simply the one that happens to 
"persuade" best? In any case, why should arguments of any sort be 
preferred over that best of all persuasive devices, the loaded gun? More-
over, in making and assessing arguments, how are we to know which 
considerations are "irrelevant?" Is it relevant, in determining whether 
people should be accorded basic civic rights, that they are Jews or 
Catholics or Protestants or Muslims or heretics or infidels or atheists? 
Many European, African and Middle Eastern societies have at various 
historical periods thought that such factors were highly relevant, and 
some societies still take this view. What should we think about such 
matters, and how are we to go about deciding? 
The problem is strikingly illustrated by Monahan's suggestion that 
legal argument is not wholly unconstrained, even if it is contingent. "It is 
constrained," he says, "in the sense that legal argument must interpret 
and advance the aspirations and ideals which exemplify the political 
tradition."21 But where does the force of that interesting word "must" 
· come from? And why should arguments that "advance" the ideals of the 
political tradition be preferred to those that seek to overturn or reform 
those ideals? If the political tradition in which I am raised is imbued with 
the notion of a master race, "must" my legal arguments be directed 
toward advancing that ideal? 
In sum, then, Monahan denies that constitutional or political deci-
sion-making can or should aspire to objectivity. And yet he also wants to 
say that it is not (and should not be) merely a matter of arbitrary choice. 
However, beyond asserting that it is somehow possible to escape from 
the realm of subjective preference to that of rational deliberation, he has 
not shown us how we may do this, or even why we should want to. 
IV. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLITICAL DECISIONS 
Monahan's main point is, of course, to argue that the "value-laden" 
character of constitutional decision-making shows that it is political. 
But to assume that because a decision is evaluative it is necessarily 
"political" rather than "legal" is, on the one hand, to fall victim to a 
21 Id., at 159. 
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narrow, positivist conception of law and, on the other, to adopt an all-
embracing view of politics, which thins out the meaning of the term 
while ignoring important differences between various sorts of evaluative 
decisions. When I decide to go to a hockey game rather than the opera, 
the decision is undoubtedly "value-laden," but it seems silly and un-
helpful to insist that the decision is therefore "political." Again, when I 
opt for scrambled eggs rathel' than waffles, the choice involves an evalua-
tion, yet are we bound to conclude that ordering a meal is a political act? 
In brief, there are substantial differences between various sorts of eval-
uative decisions that a reductionist "political" analysis ignores. 
More precisely, Monahan commits the error of assuming that, when 
two activities share something in common, one activity can always be 
subsumed under the other. Just because swimming and pole-vaulting are 
both energy-consuming activities, it does not follow that swimming is an 
aquatic form of pole-vaulting. And even if we think that both writing 
poetry and hairdressing are devoted to the pursuit of beauty, we need not 
infer that poets are really closet hairdressers. Similarly, from the premise 
that both constitutional and political decisions are "value-laden," it does 
not necessarily follow that constitutional decision-making is a form of 
politics or, for that matter, that politics is a form of constitutional 
decision-making. It only means that both are in some way concerned 
with values. Whether they are concerned with the same range of values, 
or are concerned with them in the same way, is another matter. 
Now, it seems intuitively clear that one of the main purposes of 
adopting a written constitution is to decide for the future certain basic 
normative questions and, accordingly, to structure future normative 
debate within a certain framework. Thus, the adoption of the Constitu-
tion Act, 186722 determined that certain formerly distinct British colo-
nies in North America would be united in a single country under a federal 
system allocating power between national and provincial governments. 
The Act resolved certain important political issues, notably whether 
such a federation was desirable and what general shape it should take. 
But this latter point must be carefully appreciated. The questions were 
decided, but not in the sense that they were now closed to political 
discussion, for political debate over the merits of Confederation has 
never really ended. Rather, the adoption of the 1867 Act meant that a 
working system of governmental bodies was actually put into place along 
the lines envisaged in the Act, with courts regulating governmental 
observance of the Act. This working system remains in place until 
amended or overthrown, and provides a stable point of reference for 
practical deliberation and action. 
'" 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.). 
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Thus, prior to 1867, when the government of Nova Scotia contem-
plated passing a bill, the major question was simply whether the Bill was 
politically desirable, that is, whether it was for the common good of the 
community and the benefit of individual citizens; but, after 1867, the 
government had an additional question to consider, namely, wh~ther or 
·not the Bill fell within the powers granted to provincial governments by 
the Constitution Act, 1867. It would be for the Nova Scotia government 
in the first instance to consider and answer this question, although the 
courts might later be involved in a constitutional challenge to the legisla-
tion. Under the Constitution the Nova Scotia government has the initial 
responsibility to ensure that its legislation comes within the alloted 
provincial sphere. 
However, it should be noted that the question of the constitutionality 
of the Bill, as considered by the Nova Scotia government, is different 
from the question of the Bill's overall political merits. This is true even 
though no court is as yet involved in the question. The government of 
Nova Scotia has to determine whether or not its proposed action is 
constitutional, which is not the same as deciding whether the proposed 
action is politically meritorious. Now, one can argue that both questions 
are in some sense value-laden, and perhaps they are. But that does not 
detract from the fact that they are different questions, and sufficiently 
different to merit different appellations. Thus, it is customary to say that 
the question of the merits of the Bill is "political," while the question of 
whether the Bill is within the governmental powers of Nova Scotia is 
"constitutional." The difference is more than a matter of mere words or 
classification, for the government might well reach the conclusion that 
the Bill is politically sound but constitutionally illegitimate. 
, It also seems true that, although both sorts of decisions may be value-
laden, the evaluative considerations that figure in resolving the constitu-
tional question are likely to differ somewhat from those pertaining to the 
Bill's political merits. Suppose the Nova Scotia government is consider-
ing passing legislation to help stamp out the growing traffic in narcotics 
in the province. In any debate over the political merits of the proposed 
legislation the question of whether the Bill would relate to criminal law 
as distinct from, for example, property and civil rights would be largely 
irrelevant. But such questions would be central to any debate over the 
Bill's constitutionality, simply because of the provisions of the Constitu-
tion Act, 1867 and the normative decisions reflected there. 
Thus the degree to which a constitutional question is, in this sense, 
political depends upon the extent to which the constitutional norms that 
figure in the constitutional debate coincide or overlap with those appli-
- cable in the political debate. As can readily be appreciated, this sort of 
overlap is likely to be greater in questions arising under the Charter than 
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under the division of powers in the 1867 Act. But even under the Charter 
the constitutional debate is likely to proceed along lines somewhat 
different than would a purely political debate, where the only question is 
the overall desirability of the legislation in question. 
Oddly, at certain junctures Monahan seems to recognize this basic 
point. In commenting, for example, on the Supreme Court's judgment in 
the Constitutional Reference,23 he states: "The decision may well have 
reflected shrewd political judgment on the part of the Court; as is well 
known, the effect of the judgment was to force the parties back to the 
bargaining table for one final effort to reach a compromise solution. Yet, 
whatever its political merits, the Court's legal analysis was confusing, 
internally inconsistent and a total contradiction of its opinion in the 
Senate Reference just two years earlier."24 One would have thought that, 
on Monahan's premises, once the political merits of a constitutional 
decision had been assessed, there would be nothing left to say about its 
"constitutional" or "legal" merits. The implication seems to be that 
constitutional law is, after all, a discipline governed by standards that are 
not necessarily identical to those of politics. 
V. THE ROLE OF ELITES 
One of Monahan's important themes is that constitutional analysis 
does not require a specialized or technical brand of expertise, so that such 
analysis is a legitimate matter of concern to all Canadians, rather than 
"the preserve of an elite group of specialists or experts."25 Now, it would 
be hard to deny the desirability of engaging a broad spectrum of the 
interested public in constitutional debates; although this theme is a 
familiar one, it certainly bears repetition. A curious feature of Mon-
ahan's book, however, is that some of his basic arguments in fact point in 
a different direction. 
Thus, Monahan argues that judicial interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, properly understood, is "an exercise in political theory,"26 and he 
calls for constitutional scholarship to be practised "within an expanded 
universe, one which includes and is sensitive to the whole of political and 
social theory."27 He also emphasizes that political theory involves "rich 
and sophisticated debates" about the true character and implications of 
"contested concepts,"28 and that the standard training of lawyers and 
23 Reference re .4mendment of the Constitution of Canada, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 11 
Man. R. (2d) l, 34 Nfld. P.E.I.R. l, {1981] 6 W.W.R. 1, 125 D.L.R. (3d) l, 39 N.R. I. 
24 Supra, note 3, at 192 (emphasis added). 
25 Id., at iv. 
06 Id., at 12. 
17 Id., at iv. 
"s Id., at 54. 
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judges does not properly equip them to engage in these debates.29 In a 
cQlourful passage he remarks: "The enactment of the Charter is like an 
unscheduled 'night drop', in which Canada's judges and lawyers have 
been parachuted unawares into the battlefields of political theory, with-
out weapons, and with no knowledge of the deployment of the contend-
ing armies. "30 
By Monahan's account, then, these sophisticated debates cannot be 
understood or conducted by just anyone. They require people with a 
specialized grounding in political theory: "experts," one might say. 
These people alone are in a position to appreciate the "nature and 
subtlety of these theoretical debates."31 Such important matters cannot, 
it would appear, be left in the hands of ordinary souls, any more than the 
command of armies can be turned over to raw recruits. 
Who then is best qualified to illuminate ordinary lawyers and judges 
on these matters? The answer seems to be: academics. Monahan's heavy 
reliance on the writings of such theorists as Ely, Dworkin, Unger, Ken-
nedy and Walzer testifies to his tacit belief that the inert dough of the 
Canadian judiciary needs animation by heavy doses of academic yeast. It 
may be noted that Monahan's preferred yeast comes in bright packages 
from the Great Emporium to the south. 
Now, all this seems very much an elite enterprise. For, if Roberto 
U nger's works are not on the bedside tables of many lawyers and judges, 
they are hardly the preferred reading of most ordinary Canadians and 
the politicians they elect. The theoretical debates to which Monahan 
refers will probably seem pointless if not largely incomprehensible to 
many honest citizens, who will judge them (perhaps not without reason) 
to be divorced from the practical concerns of everyday life. What Mon-
ahan proposes, then, is to deliver the Constitution into the embrace of a 
small coterie of academic theorists. Whether this is a desirable course of 
action can be debated; my point is simply that Monahan's program leads 
us down paths different than his democratic verbal flourishes would 
suggest. 
The same tendency is visible at other points in his analysis. Thus, 
Monahan argues that the Charter requires judges to engage in a balanc-
ing of interests, and that this entails a form of cost-benefit analysis, 
involving "complex factual and normative issues."32 But he maintains 
that interest-balancing is a "quintessentially legislative task," for only 
the legislature is equipped "to deal with the vast array of data" germane 
to such an inquiry.33 It must be doubted, however, whether Monahan 
w Id., at iv and 54. 
~0 Id., at 54. 
31 Id. 
32 Id., at 135-36. 
'' Id., at 53. 
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really thinks that the average member of Parliament is better positioned 
than the average judge to cope with this "vast array of data" in a detailed 
and understanding way. As is well known, much detailed governmental 
policy is formulated and legislation drafted, not by Members of Parlia-
ment, or even by Ministers, but by a bureaucratic elite with highly 
specialized skills and experience. 34 
To the extent that Monanan emphasizes the complexity of the issues 
involved in making basic political and legal decisions, I suggest that he is 
also implicitly committed to the view that such decisions require the 
assistance of people with relatively uncommon and specialized skills - if 
not the average judge on the bench, neither the average person in the 
corner doughnut store. Once again, then, his analysis implicitly draws us -
in the direction of an elite, although in this case the elite appears to be the 
governmental technocracy that lies beyond the velvet curtains of the 
· modern Canadian legislature rather than the academic elite. But the 
links between the academic and bureaucratic elites in Canada should not 
be underestimated. 
So, Monahan's early insistence that constitutional adjudication does 
not involve a specialized brand of expertise, which is said to open 
constitutional debates to ordinary Canadians, eventually drifts into the 
view that a different brand of expertise is required - namely, a grasp of a 
sophisticated body of political theory coupled with the ability to cope 
with large bodies of complicated data. Judges, it is said, lack these 
qualifications due to deficiencies in their education and training. But 
ordinary people are similarly lacking, and so, for the most part, are 
parliamentarians. Thus, despite the populist language and the appeal to 
the ideals of democracy and community, Monahan arguably espouses 
views with strong elitist undertones. But, while he distrusts the judicial 
elite and has ambiguous feelings about members oflegislatures, he seems 
to have a strong underlying faith in academia and the governmental 
bureaucracy. Not everyone who has experienced academic life or cl.ealt 
with bureaucrats would share this faith. 
'
14 Thus, The Globe and Mail, Toronto reports on June 28, 1988: "The federal Govern-
ment's chief salesman for the free-trade accord with the United States says he hasn't read 
the entire agreement and doesn't intend to. 'I haven't read the whole of the free-trade 
agreement,' International Trade minister John Crosbie told reporters. 'I've read all of the 
free-trade agreement that I feel is necessary for me to read and then I have a whole 
department of people to interpret it. I'm not going to sit down and read every word of the 
free-trade agreement.' He said he has read the parts he considers important 'for a generalist 
to know' but could not specify what they are." 
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CONCLUSION 
Standing back, now, from a detailed appraisal of Monahan's work, a 
number of general points deserve mention, I suggest that anyone who 
wants to understand constitutional decision-making and to explore its 
connections with politics is unwise to focus mainly on judges as constitu-
tional decision-makers. The mistake is one into which lawyers, such as 
Monahan, are particularly prone to fall. Even while criticizing the per-
formance of the courts or arguing that the judicial role is over-blown, 
many lawyers still tacitly take courts to be at the centre of the constitu-
tional universe. The better view, I suggest, is that the Constitution binds 
not only the courts but also members of the legislature and the executive; 
all three branches of government are required to follow constitutional 
standards in making decisions within their separate spheres. Conse-
quently, the decisions of the legislative and exec1:ltive branches on these 
matters are in many respects as important as those of the courts in 
moulding the constitutional culture that sustains the Constitution and 
gives it meaning.35 The failure to consider the roles of politicians and 
public servants in implementing the Constitution not only makes Mon-
ahan's analysis incomplete, it distorts his understanding of the judicial 
role and the relation that it bears to decision-making in the other 
branches of government. 
A second failing in Monahan's approach may be noted. It is unhelpful 
to characterize constitutional adjudication as "political" without going 
on to specify what the pursuit of politics entails, the goals it aims to 
attain, and the basic principles informing its practice. The word "politi-
cal" has no clearly defined meaning in modem usage. Rather, as Mon-· 
ahan's own work illustrates, it has the chameleon-like capacity to change 
colours to blend with a variety of different conceptual backgrounds. Of 
course, if we adopt an Aristotelian notion of politics as the pursuit of the 
common good of a community and the individual goods of its members, 
we can agree that constitutional adjudication should in some manner be 
informed by this pursuit. But to say that judges, like other governmental 
figures, should act for the good of the community and its members does 
not carry us very far in understanding what that good entails and how it 
can be achieved, or in determining the relative roles of Canadian judges, 
legislators and administrators in the process. 
I have argued here that good constitutional decision-making entails a 
variety of particular arts or skills that are best learned by experience and 
practice within the tradition. These skills, in some degree, are possessed 
:i.; The point is developed at greater length in my paper "A Theory of the Charter" 
(1987), 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 701. · 
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by able politicians, administrators and judges alike - but each role has 
its distinctive traditions, which emphasize different skills and abilities. 
The qualities of a good judge are not identical to those of a good politi-
cian. Moreover, judges, politicians and administrators alike need a vari-
ety of specialized skills, not possessed by the average person, in order to 
carry out their mandates successfully. 
What role, then, should-theorizing play in reaching constitutional 
decisions? I suggest that, contrary to what Monahan maintains, a judge 
or other decision-maker should be guided primarily by a sense of what is 
right in the concrete circumstances of a particular case. A judge's sense of 
rightness should, let it be said, be informed by broad constitutional 
·experience, a detailed grasp of the precedents and reflection on the case's 
broader implications. In the end, however, it is the concrete intuition of 
where the true path lies that should predominate. Although formal 
reasoning and explicit justification are usually desirable features of 
judicial decision-making, they should not be allowed to usurp the posi-
tion of good sense as the nerve of the process. If logic is not the life of the 
law, neither is theory its vital juice. What constitutional adjudication 
involves, then, is contextual decision~making within a particular tradi-
tion by reference to values and principles that represent aspects of the 
tradition without exhausting it. 
But tradition alone is an inadequate basis for making constitutional 
decisions. Why should we bind ourselves to the ossified preferences of 
our society? Yet the alternative of casting ourselves adrift on a sea of 
individual preferences is little more attractive. Only on the assumption 
that a transcendent basis for moral and political judgment exists can 
debates within a society over the justice and morality of existing arrange-
ments be anything more than a senseless battle of wind and tide. The 
idea of equality, for example, has no power against conventional dif-
ferentiations made between the sexes - no power, that is, beyond that of 
one arbitrary notion against another arbitrary notion - unless it is 
anchored in a belief in the equal worth of the individual human being, a 
worth that has a transcendent and not merely conventional status. 
Whether there is in fact some way in which, through the distorting lens 
of culture and tradition, we may glimpse aspects of transcendent goods 
and principles of justice is another question. But it is no solution to shut 
our eyes and whistle loudly. 
